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ABSTRACT 
Indexicality is at the core of many major philosophical problems.1 In the last years, 
recorded messages and written notes have become a significant test and an intriguing 
puzzle for the semantics of indexical expressions.2 In this paper, I argue that a parallel may 
be drawn between the determination of the reference of the indexical expressions in 
recorded messages or written texts, and the determination of the illocutionary force of 
recorded or written utterances. To this aim, I will endorse the intention-based approach 
proposed by Stefano Predelli - and in particular his distinction between context of 
utterance and context of interpretation. 
 
 
1. Indexicals and demonstratives 
 
As it is well known, indexicals are referential expressions having a reference 
only given a context of utterance: different occurrences of the same indexical 
as a type can have different referents. Independently of any context 
whatsoever, the conventional meaning of an indexical sentence like 
 
(1) I am drunk, 
 
cannot determine the truth-conditions of the sentence: to evaluate (1), the 
referent of “I” must be identified. The truth-conditions of an indexical 
sentence are thus indirectly determined, as a function of the context of 
utterance of the sentence, and in particular as a function of the values of the 
indexicals. According to David Kaplan and John Perry, a function is assigned 
                                                 
1 As John Perry remarks, “such words as 'I', 'now', and 'this' play crucial roles in arguments 
and paradoxes about such philosophically rich subjects as the self, the nature of time, and 
the nature of perception”: Perry 1997, p. 586. 
2 See Bianchi 2001, Corazza et al. 2002, Perry 2001, Predelli 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 
2005, Romdenh-Romluc 2002, and Smith 1989. In a recent paper, Jennifer Saul suggests a 
rather surprising application of the current investigation on indexicals. Saul draws on the 
literature on indexicals and recorded messages in order to criticise Rae Langton's claim that 
works of pornography can be understood as illocutionary acts – in particular acts of 
subordinating women or acts of silencing women: cf. Langton 1993, Hornsby 1993, 
Hornsby and Langton 1998, Saul 2006. In Bianchi 2008, I argue that Saul's analysis doesn't 
undermine Langton's thesis. 
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to each indexical expression as a type: the character, in Kaplan’s terminology, 
or the role, in Perry’s terminology. Given a context, the character determines 
the content of the occurrence – which is a function from circumstances of 
evaluation (possible world and time) to truth-values. The semantic value of an 
indexical is thus determined by a conventional rule and by a contextual 
parameter of the context of utterance. The character of an indexical encodes 
the specific contextual co-ordinate that is relevant for the determination of its 
semantic value: for “I” the relevant parameter is the speaker of the utterance, 
for “here” the place of the utterance, for “now”, the time of the utterance, and 
so on. The designation is then automatic, “given meaning and public 
contextual facts”.3 
Furthermore, Kaplan and Perry introduce the distinction between pure 
indexicals and demonstratives. The meaning of a demonstrative, like “she” in 
the sentence 
 
(2) She is drunk, 
 
doesn’t give an automatic rule individuating, once a context is given, the 
referent of the expression. In “Afterthoughts” Kaplan claims that every 
occurrence of a demonstrative as a type has to be associated with a directing 
intention.4 In a similar vein, Perry draws the distinction between automatic 
and intentional indexicals. According to Perry, the speaker’s intentions play 
no role in the determination of the reference of “I”, “here”, or “now”: Perry 
calls those expressions automatic indexicals. Conversely, as far as a 
demonstrative is concerned, the determination of the reference is not 
automatic and the speaker’s intentions become relevant: in this sense 
demonstratives are intentional. 
 
 
2. Written notes and contexts 
 
Serious objections to the distinction between pure indexicals and 
demonstratives have been raised. In particular, many scholars underline that, 
in some cases, the referents of utterances of “here” and “now” are not 
obtained by applying their characters to the context of utterance. As I said, 
recorded messages and written notes are a significant test for the semantics of 
indexical expressions: examples involving the message of an answering 
machine or a written note cannot be evaluated with respect to the context of 
utterance or inscription. Let examine some of them. 
                                                 
3 Perry 1997, p. 595. 
4 Kaplan 1989, p. 588: “The directing intention is the element that differentiates the 
'meaning' of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative from another, creating the 
potential for distinct referents, and creating the actuality of equivocation”. 
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Consider the message of an answering machine like 
 
(3) I’m not here now. 
 
According to the view sketched in § 1, the message has a paradoxical 
content: the speaker of the utterance is not at the place of the utterance at the 
time of the utterance. Yet, intuitively, an utterance of (3) may well be true. 
Or imagine that John, while in his office, writes a note reading: 
 
(4) I am here, 
 
and then, arrived home, leaves it in the kitchen, to let his wife Mary know 
that he is back from work: the note is not informing Mary that John is in his 
office (the place of utterance or inscription), but rather that he is at home. 
In order to determine the reference of the indexical expressions in (3) and 
(4), we must fix the relevant context. Apparently, we have two candidates: 
 
a) the context in which the utterance is recorded or produced - encoded; 
b) the context in which it is heard or read - decoded. 
 
There are two possible alternatives, allowing to remain in a traditional 
framework and, in particular allowing to maintain the distinction between 
pure indexicals – semantically complete, automatic, functional – and 
demonstratives – semantically incomplete, intentional, pragmatic. The two 
alternatives are the Many Characters View and the Remote Utterance View. 
• According to the Many Characters View, there are two characters 
associated with the indexical “now”, one for the time of production of the 
utterance containing “now” (the coding time) and one for the time the 
utterance is heard or read (the decoding time). 
But associating two characters with “now” or “here” amounts to 
multiplying meanings unnecessarily, and to accepting the unpleasant and 
counterintuitive conclusion that indexicals have more than one meaning. 
• According to the Remote Utterance View, written notes and recorded 
messages allow a speaker to utter sentences “at a distance”, so to speak; in 
other terms they allow to utter sentences at time t and location l without 
being in l at t. In this line of thought, the owner of the answering machine 
“uttered” (3) when someone phoned, and John “uttered” (4) at home, when 
his wife read his note. 
Let’s examine the Remote Utterance View, by focusing on an example 
adapted from Predelli.5 Suppose that, before leaving home at 8 ‘o clock in the 
                                                 
5 Cf. Predelli 1998a and 1998b. 
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morning, Ridge writes a note to Brooke, who will be back from work at 5 ‘o 
clock in the evening: 
 
(5) As you can see, I’m not here now. Meet me in two hours at “Le Café 
Russe”. 
 
Intuitively, the note does not convey the (false) content that Ridge is not 
at home at the time of utterance (the coding time) of the note, nor does it ask 
Brooke to be at “Le Café Russe” at 10 ‘o clock in the morning – namely two 
hours after he wrote the note. Therefore, the Remote Utterance View would 
conclude that a) must be ruled out: the relevant context is b), the context in 
which the note is read, or decoded. Ridge “uttered” (5) at 5 p.m., when Brooke 
came home from work. 
 
 
3. Speech acts and contexts 
 
A parallel may be drawn between the determination of the reference of the 
indexical expressions in recorded messages or written texts, and the 
determination of the illocutionary force of recorded utterances. Written texts 
(but also recorded radio or TV programs, films, and images) may be seen as 
recordings that can be used in many different contexts – exactly like an 
answering machine message. Let examine the example of a sign reading 
 
(6) I do 
 
created by Brooke as a multi-purpose sign and used by her in different 
contexts to get married, to agree to return her books in time in a library or to 
confess to a murder.6 The question is to establish which context determines 
the speech act performed by an agent using a recording: 
 
a) the context in which the sentence is recorded or produced; 
b) the context in which the sentence is heard or read. 
 
According to a version of the Remote Utterance View for speech acts, the 
different speech acts performed by Brooke depend on features of the contexts 
in which Brooke used the sign (choice b)), and not on features of the context in 
which she made it (choice a)).7 She may use (6) in a church, to get married, or 
                                                 
6 I adapt Saul's example in Saul 2006. 
7 Saul endorses such a conclusion; cf. Saul 2006, p. 237. “Which speech act was performed, 
intuitively, hinges on some combination of Ethel's intentions in using her sign, the 
audiences' interpretations of her utterances, and the fulfillment of necessary felicity 
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in a library, to agree to return her books in time, or in a police station, to 
confess to a murder: it is the context in which the sentence is used that 
determines the illocutionary force of the speech act performed by the agent. 
 
 
4. Indexicals and intended context 
 
However, we may find some powerful arguments against b). Let’s go back to 
indexical sentences like (5). Predelli imagines that Brooke comes home late, 
and reads (5) at 10 p.m. Intuitively, Ridge is not inviting her for dinner at 
midnight: she must interpret the message not in relation to her actual time of 
arrival but to her expected time of arrival (the expected decoding time) – an 
intuition the Remote Utterance View cannot account for. 
In order to account for examples (3) – (5), Predelli suggests that we 
distinguish between the context of utterance (or inscription) and a context the 
speaker considers semantically relevant, that is the (intended) context of 
interpretation.8 The character of “now” in (5) does not apply either to the 
context of utterance/inscription, or to the decoding context. In (5), the 
context giving the correct interpretation contains, as the temporal co-
ordinate, Brooke’s expected time of arrival (5 p.m.) and not the moment 
Ridge wrote the note (8 a.m.) or the moment Brooke came home (10 p.m.): 
this intended context provides the correct values for “now and “in two hours”, 
i.e. 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., while keeping the usual characters for the two 
expressions. 
 
 
5. Speech acts and intended context 
 
Let’s now turn to (6). According to the version of the Remote Utterance View 
for speech acts, in order to determine the illocutionary force of the different 
speech acts performed by Brooke, we must focus on the different decodings of 
(6) (hearings or viewings: choice b)). Different viewings of a written utterance 
or different hearings of a recorded message, it may be argued, could have 
different illocutionary forces. It is the context in which an utterance is 
actually heard or seen (and not the context in which it is recorded) which 
determines the speech act accomplished by a recording. 
If the parallel between indexical expressions and speech acts holds, 
however, we have a compelling argument against the choice of b) as the 
context relevant to determine the illocutionary force of a speech act in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
conditions. These are all features of the contexts in which Ethel's sign was used (rather 
than features of the context in which it was made)”. 
8 Predelli 1998a, p. 403 and Predelli 1998b, p. 112. 
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general, and of a recorded utterance in particular. Just imagine that Brooke 
has created (6) in order to get married: she is standing in the church, holding 
her sign in front of her fiancé Ridge and the priest. A police officer 
investigating for the savage murder of Ridge’s first wife Taylor is in the 
audience. Struck by an intuition, suddenly the officer stands up and asks 
Brooke “Do you confess you murdered Taylor?”. He sees Brooke’s sign 
reading (6), interprets it as a confession and arrests her for murder. 
Nevertheless, intuitively Brooke is not pleading guilty for Taylor’s murder: 
the police officer must interpret the sign not in relation to the actual viewing 
but to the expected viewing – an intuition the Remote Utterance View for 
speech acts cannot account for. 
Following Predelli’s suggestion, I claim that to fix the illocutionary force of 
a speech act, the addressee should not consider (at least, not directly) either 
the context of production of the utterance, or the context of actual decoding 
of the utterance. She should instead consider an “intended” context, taken as 
semantically relevant by the speaker, and available as such to the addressee: this 
context will be the relevant context of interpretation. What especially matters 
are the intentions the speaker makes available to the addressee: if they are 
transparent, publicly accessible and manifest, these intentions determine 
which particular speech act has been performed. The speaker’s intentions 
direct the addressee to this intended context - which is identified and sorted 
out by pragmatic means (knowledge of the world, of the speaker’s desires and 
beliefs, of social practices, and so on). If an utterance is intended as an 
illocutionary act of getting married, and if this intention is made available to 
the addressee, no accidental viewing may change the illocutionary force of the 
utterance. It is not the actual viewing that fixes the illocutionary force of the 
utterance, but the expected viewing. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that a parallel may be drawn between the determination of the 
reference of the indexical expressions in recorded messages or written texts, 
and the determination of the illocutionary force of recorded or written 
utterances. To this aim, I have endorsed the intention-based approach 
proposed by Predelli - and in particular his distinction between context of 
utterance and context of interpretation. It is not the context in which an 
utterance is heard or seen that determines the speech act performed by the 
utterance. What matters is the intended context: the illocutionary force of a 
speech act is fixed only once the intended context is fixed - a determination 
involving encyclopaedic knowledge of the world and of the speaker’s desires, 
beliefs and intentions. 
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In closing, let me stress again this very point.9 An intention, to be 
semantically relevant, must be made available or communicated to the 
addressee10, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the 
context, words, gestures, relevance in the context of utterance; nevertheless, 
this exploitation of the context has only the role of manifesting the intention, 
of externalising it – a role of pragmatic aid to communication.11 Even Ridge 
can’t recognise every bizarre intention that Brooke could have, such as, for 
example, the intention – holding in the church the sign saying (6) - of agreeing 
to return her books in time, if no evidence of her intention was made available 
to him. A communicative intention must be something that an addressee in 
normal circumstances is able to work out using external facts (where, when 
and by whom the utterance is produced), linguistic co-text (what has been 
said so far), and background knowledge (knowledge about weddings, libraries, 
or murder investigations).12 No arbitrary or unreasonable intention the author 
of a speech act could have plays a role in fixing the illocutionary force of her 
speech act – if the author hasn’t done enough to make her intention available 
to the addressee.13 
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